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REBUTTAL: ONE LAST CASE
RICHARD

E.

SPEIDEL

I have read with interest and appreciation the careful response of
Dean Rogers and Ms. Michaels to my critique of the Seventh Circuit's
warranty decisions. They have, in a gentle manner, suggested that at
times I have been overzealous in my criticism. Rather than respond directly to them, let me conclude with a brief analysis of a recent Seventh
Circuit warranty case that was not reported at the time of the original
survey. Once again, the seller prevailed, this time with some justification.
Once again, however, there were methodological problems.
In Trans-Aire International, Inc. v. Northern Adhesive Co.,1 the
buyer (Trans-Aire) needed an adhesive to laminate various materials
used in the process of converting standard automotive vans to recreational vehicles. The first brand of adhesive used (3M 4500) frequently
failed to adhere under summer temperatures. Trans-Aire then approached the seller (Northern), a manufacturer of diversified adhesive
products, and stated the purposes for which it needed adhesives. Northern sent Trans-Aire several samples for experimentation and allegedly
stated that one sample, #7448, was a "match" for 3M 4500. Trans-Aire
tested the samples under cool rather than hot weather conditions. After
extensive intracorporate discussions, Trans-Aire decided not to do a test
under summer conditions and ordered several shipments of #7448 over
a seven month period from Northern. By May, 1983, it was evident that
#7448 performed no better than 3M 4500 under summer temperatures.
Trans-Aire, which was required to repair over 500 hundred vans, sued
Northern for breach of warranty. The district court, after an evidentiary
2
hearing, granted Northern's motion for summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The chief evidence upon which
Northern sought a summary judgment was the deposition of a former
Trans-Aire employee. Trans-Aire admitted that it could not muster any
evidence to conflict with the deposition. The Court, therefore, focused
"solely upon Trans-Aire's ability to demonstrate that the district court's
legal conclusions are erroneous" rather than whether there was a genuine
3
issue of material fact.
1. 882 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 1256 (the district court opinion is unreported).
3. Id. at 1257. (References to the "Court" mean the United States Court of Appeals for the
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THE EXISTENCE OF WARRANTIES

The first question was whether Northern made and breached any
warranty that #7448 was suitable for Trans-Aire's laminating purposes.
This, in turn, depended in part upon who had what burden of proof to
establish that there was or was not a warranty.
Since the adhesive had been accepted, Trans-Aire had the burden
"to establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted."' 4 There
was, apparently, no dispute over whether the adhesive was unmerchantable. Trans-Aire introduced no evidence that #7448 was not "fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."'5 The Court's primary concern, therefore, was whether there was a breach of the implied
warranty of fitness or whether Northern made an express warranty that
#7448 was fit for Trans-Aire's purposes.
On the fitness warranty, the Court began by incorrectly paraphrasing the text of U.C.C. section 2-315. According to the Court:
Section 2-315 of the code states that a sale of goods also includes an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if a seller knows of
the buyer's particular purpose for the goods and the buyer
relies upon
6
the seller's skill or judgment to select suitable goods.
Among other things, this paraphrase substitutes the word "knows" for
the phrase "has reason to know," thereby making it harder for the buyer
to prevail. A seller may have "reason to know" without having actual
knowledge of a fact.7 The paraphrase also creates an ambiguity by deleting a critical "that," which, in section 2-315, requires the seller to have
reason to know both "any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods."" The paraphrase suggests, incorrectly,
that the buyer who relies may win even though the seller has no reason to
know of the reliance.
Inaccurate paraphrasing aside, the Court correctly concluded that
the question was whether, assuming that Northern "knew" of TransSeventh Circuit). If the movant has, when the entire record is considered, demonstrated the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact, the inquiry shifts to whether the evidence actually submitted is
sufficient as a matter of law. See Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 686 F. Supp.
1319, 1325-26 (N.D. Ill.
1988). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 4.10, 5.19
(1985).
4. U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (1987). The Court did not cite this section.
5. Id. § 2-314(2)(c). The Court paraphrased § 2-314(1) in the text and quoted the provision in
a footnote. 882 F.2d at 1257. There was no further discussion.
6. 882 F.2d at 1257. Section 2-315 is quoted at id. n.3.
7. A person "knows" of a fact when he has "actual knowledge of it." A person has "notice"
of facts when "from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has
reason to know that it exists." U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1987).
8. Id. § 2-315 (emphasis added).
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Aire's purposes, Trans-Aire relied in fact upon Northern's skill and judgment. The district court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the reliance issue and the Seventh Circuit agreed. By
conducting its own experiments on the samples that Northern furnished
and by making its own decision on which sample was suitable, TransAire relied upon its own rather than Northern's skill and judgment in
selecting suitable adhesive. This result, on the uncontested facts, is
clearly defensible under section 2-315, however badly it was
paraphrased. 9
The Court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that Northern, even though it knew of them, made no express warranty that #7448
or any other sample was fit for Trans-Aire's particular purposes. To the
contrary, Northern stated only that #7448 was a "match" for 3M 4500
and that there was "no warranty on [adhesive 7448] other than thatwhat they would ship would be like the sample. It would be the same
chemistry." 10
Again, this result is defensible under section 2-313 in a summary
judgment proceeding. There was, apparently, no evidence that Northern
affirmed or promised that #7448 would be fit for Trans-Aire's purposes.
At most, the sample of #7448 provided by Northern amounted to a
warranty that the "whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model." I' As such, the Court avoided, without any overt awareness, the
"basis of the bargain" quagmire which has plagued the Seventh Circuit
in other decisions.12
II.

DISCLAIMERS

Not content to affirm on the grounds that no warranties were created as a matter of law, the Court proceeded to an alternative ground for
affirmance. Assuming that an implied warranty that #7448 was fit for
Trans-Aire's known purposes was created under section 2-315, the question was whether it was excluded because Trans-Aire had examined and
tested the goods before the contract was formed?
9. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-11, at 421 (3d ed. 1988)

(in "unusual" case where buyer is more knowledgeable than seller, seller may win on the grounds
that the buyer did not rely). The Court cited no authorities to support its conclusion.
10. 882 F.2d at 1260.
11. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c) (1987).
12. If Northern had stated that #7448 was suitable for Trans-Aire's known purpose and
Trans-Aire then purchased the goods, the burden would shift to Northern to prove that the affirmation did not become part of the "basis of the bargain." Trans-Aire, 882 F.2d at 1260. In this setting,
the absence of any evidence from Northern that Trans-Aire did not rely means that the court should
grant a summary judgment to Trans-Aire.
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Under Article 2, the answer depends upon the relationship between
section 2-316(2) and section 2-316(3)(b). Under the former subsection,
the exclusion of the implied warranty of fitness "must be by a writing and
conspicuous." This limitation, however, is subject to section 2-316(3)(b),
which provides:
When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him.
The Court did not engage in an extensive statutory analysis. Rather,
after paraphrasing and quoting snippets from section 2-316(3)(b), the
Court affirmed the district court's holding that any implied warranty had
been excluded or waived by Trans-Aire's conduct in examining and testing the samples.
Assuming that Trans-Aire examined the goods as "fully as he desired," the statutory question under section 2-316(3)(b) was whether the
implied warranty of fitness was excluded "with regard to defects which
an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him."
Conceding that goods which fail to conform to an implied warranty of
fitness contain "defects," it is clear that Trans-Aire failed to discover the
defects during its examination under "cool" conditions. Under those
"circumstances," it is hard to conclude that the defects "ought" to have
been revealed. Presumably, the defects would not be evident unless the
adhesive was tested under summer conditions. Given that Trans-Aire
knew of these other "circumstances" and made no further tests, can the
Court conclude as a matter of law that Trans-Aire failed to perform a
"reasonably adequate examination that would have revealed the
defect"? 13
Although the deposition evidence established that Trans-Aire decided not to test #7448 under summer conditions, there was no evidence
from either side on the feasibility of conducting such tests or the
probability that the tests, if conducted, would have revealed the defects.
Even so, the Court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material
fact on whether Trans-Aire "ought" to have or "should have" conducted
the additional examination.1 4 The further testing should have been done
13. Comment, Special Project-Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transaction" An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1280-82 (1987) (concluding that questions of fact "often arise" in
the determination of whether a buyer "ought" to have discovered the defect). See also Comment,
Special Project-Article Two Warrantiesin Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. REV.30, 197202 (1978).
14. The inference is that unless the buyer contests the feasibility issue, it will be "held to have
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and by failing to act, Trans-Aire "waived" the implied warranty.
Yet in reaching this conclusion, the Court assumed that an implied
warranty of fitness had been made. This means that Northern had reason to know of Trans-Aire's purposes and that Trans-Aire would rely
upon the suitability of #7448. Given this, the Court fails to explain why
the failure to undertake the more difficult testing was not justified by
Trans-Aire's assumed reliance on the implied warranty of fitness.
The obvious answer is that Trans-Aire, on the facts, did not in fact
rely on Northern's skill and judgment.' 5 As such, the exclusive grounds
for the affirmance should have been section 2-315 rather than section 2316(3)(b). This ground avoids the sticky issues not fully explored under
section 2-316(3)(b).
III.

EVALUATION

As suggested, the result in Trans-Aire on whether any warranties
were created is defensible on the facts in a summary judgment setting.
Given the lack of conflicting evidence, this was not the best case for a
clearer discussion of the role of summary judgment in disposing of warranty claims under Article 2.16 When that case arises, the Court should
be more explicit on who has what burden of proof and be more sensitive
to the Code's underlying policy favoring the admissibility of surrounding
circumstances in warranty disputes.
The Court, however, paraphrased, sometimes improperly, the relevant statutes and cited the text in the footnotes. This is clearly improper.
Beyond plain sloppiness, the practice undercuts the legitimate source of
law in these disputes and provides little incentive for the parties or the
court to pay attention to interlocking statutory provisions, definitions,
comments, and legislative history. Thus, Trans-A ire is yet another example of incomplete, if not improper, Code methodology in a case which
arguably reaches a correct result.17
assumed the risk as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to observe .
U.C.C. § 2316 comment 8 (1987). If, however, Trans-Aire had raised a factual issue on feasibility and Northern had failed to submit evidence on whether the defect "ought" to have been discovered, summary
judgment should be denied. See Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1319,
1334 (N.D. Ill.
1988). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 12-6, at 508-11.
15. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 509-10 (pre-contract examination is one
factor that prevents creation of express warranty).
16. See Quaker Alloy, 686 F. Supp. at 1325-26.
17. The Court's opinion also lacks the richness that inspires confidence in its conclusions of
law. Paraphrased statutory language, facts, and some reference to the comments are the key ingredients in the decision. Missing are references to other cases that have decided the same issues, whether
within or without the Seventh Circuit, and secondary literature. There is a sense of spare isolation
rather than an intimate connection with the developing warranty jurisprudence under Article 2.
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Finally, the Court unduly complicated the issues by attempting to
justify the result by an alternative holding under section 2-316(3)(b). To
do this, the Court assumed that an implied warranty of fitness was made
under section 2-315. In the process, two issues were not carefully
worked out. First, the Court failed to explain why, as a matter of law,
the failure of Trans-Aire to conduct additional experiments under different circumstances "ought" to have revealed the defects, especially where
there was no evidence on feasibility or probability. Second, the Court
failed to explain why, if Northern knew that Trans-Aire would rely upon
its skill and judgment, Trans-Aire was not justified in deciding not to
conduct the additional tests. This incomplete rendition of section 2316(3)(b) could have been avoided by concluding that since no implied
warranties were created (a result supported by the facts), there was no
need to consider whether they were excluded by examination.
Is this critique overzealous? Perhaps, if you believe that sound Code
outcomes trump the need for sound code processes. My argument, however, is that under Article 2 you cannot consistently have the former
without the latter. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit over the last
twenty-five years, by and large, support this position.

